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Western Railway and Occupational Safety on 
Britain’s Railways, c.1900-c.1920 
Mike Esbester 
In 1913, the Great Western Railway introduced an occupational 
safety education campaign that appeared to be a radical break 
with all previous methods of promoting safety in the British 
industrial workplace.  In this paper, I assess the extent to 
which this “new” campaign reinvented occupational safety 
education in Britain.  I argue that the Great Western combined 
new techniques of communicating safety messages with the 
relatively traditional content of those messages.  Rather than a 
simple repetition of previous attempts or an absolute re-
invention of safety, “Safety First” was a renewal of existing 
conceptions of occupational safety education.  I examine both 
the methods of conveying safety messages and the messages 
themselves, and place the campaign within the broader context 
of power relationships among union, state, and company. 
 
Occupational health and safety, as a subject of historical study, has 
suffered from a perception that it is somehow “peripheral” to other 
areas of inquiry.  This seems to be as true of business history as it is of 
every other branch of history, in the United States and in Britain.  The 
relative neglect is perhaps surprising, as safety issues were (and, 
indeed, still are) an important factor in relations within the workplace.  
We can partly explain such a dearth of attention by the relatively 
hidden nature of occupational safety.  Unlike matters concerning the 
consumer, workplaces were obscured from public view; those who were 
directly affected by health and safety issues tended to lack a political (or 
even a public) voice, and were consequently unable to articulate the 
shortcomings of their work environments.1
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However, within approximately the last twenty years, health and 
safety issues have received increasing attention by historians.  This is 
true of business history, with studies emphasizing the interaction of 
state, technology, and company in producing safe (or unsafe) work 
conditions.2  It has been recognized that occupational safety is an area 
in which it is possible to identify distinct changes in approach and 
mentalities over short periods of time, and thus it can make a particu-
larly valuable contribution to our understanding of the development of 
business practice.  Existing accounts examining occupational safety 
have tended to focus on political issues, analyzing state regulation of 
dangerous industries such as mining, manufacturing, and railroads.3  
There is a danger in constructing the role of business in this process as 
a rather simplistic binary, opposing government action with economic 
and parliamentary or federal influence.  In this paper, I aim to nuance 
such views, demonstrating that, although business could oppose 
external intervention, at times it went further and attempted to provide 
its own solutions to some of the perceived problems.  In this way, it is 
possible to see that “safety” as a concept and practice was socially 
constructed.  The paper further extends the place of occupational safety 
                                                                                                                                     
Cooper-Harvey for their constructive comments and suggestions on this 
paper. 
1 Roger Cooter, “The Moment of the Accident: Culture, Militarism and 
Modernity in Late-Victorian Britain,” in Accidents in History: Injuries, 
Fatalities and Social Relations, ed. Roger Cooter and Bill Luckin (Atlanta, 
Ga., 1997), 112; Judith Green, “Accidents: The Remnants of a Modern 
Classificatory System,” in Accidents in History, ed. Cooter and Luckin, 69. 
2 For example, see Steven Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: 
Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (Cambridge, U.K., 
2002); Elisabeth Cawthorn, Job Accidents and the Law in England’s Early 
Railway Age: Origins of Employer Liability and Workmen’s Compensation 
(Lampeter, Wales, 1997); Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and 
Business in the Building of American Work Safety 1870-1939 (Baltimore, 
Md., 1997); Eric Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law 
and Politics of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-
1914 (Toronto, 1990); Arthur McIvor and Ronnie Johnston, “Reinvention or 
Renewal?  The Coal Dust Problem in British Coal Mining before and after 
Nationalisation, c.1930-1975,” paper presented to the Business History 
Conference, Minneapolis, Minn., May 2005. 
3 For example, see Graham K. Wilson, The Politics of Safety and Health: 
Occupational Safety and Health in the United States and Britain (Oxford, 
U.K., 1985); Peter Bartrip, “State Intervention in Mid-Nineteenth Century 
Britain: Fact or Fiction?”  Journal of British Studies 23 (Autumn 1983): 63-
83; Arthur McIvor, “State Intervention and Work Intensification: The Politics 
of Occupational Health and Safety in the British Cotton Industry, c.1880-
1914,” in Labour, Social Policy and the Welfare State, ed. Ad Knotter, Bert 
Altena, and Dirk Damsma (Amsterdam, 1997), 125-39; Gerald Rhodes, 
Inspectorates in British Government: Law Enforcement and Standards of 
Efficiency (London, 1981); Bridget M. Hutter, Regulation and Risk: 
Occupational Health and Safety on the Railways (Oxford, U.K., 2001); Peter 
Bartrip and Paul Fenn, “Factory Fatalities and Regulation in Britain, 1878-
1913,” Explorations in Economic History 25 (Jan. 1988): 60-74. 
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in business history by considering not only the production of under-
standings of “safety,” but also how particular understandings were 
communicated to a labor force within a corporate environment.  This 
aspect has received little attention from historians or sociologists.4
I shall explore the role of occupational safety within business 
history by concentrating on the Great Western Railway (GWR).  The 
approach to safety adopted by the company forms a particularly 
illuminating example, as the GWR was one of the largest institutions in 
early twentieth-century Britain.  At the time, the railroad industry faced 
many organizational challenges: labor relations and the recognition of 
trade unions; declining profitability and increasing costs, with a con-
comitant lack of investment in infrastructure and stock; competition 
from motorized road transport; and the post-1919 restructuring of the 
industry under state direction.  Employee safety was therefore only one 
issue with which the railroads had to contend.  Yet, the railroads were 
remarkably proactive in this area; the GWR responded to the challenge 
and transformed its approach to occupational safety.  Through analysis 
of that shift, and the reasons behind it, I will provide insight into the 
transfer of business practice among nations and some of the factors 
affecting the decision-making process in business. 
Employment on the railroads was extremely dangerous for the 
manual grades: the factory staff and the operational staff, such as the 
footplate crew, those men working on the railroad lines, and 
brakemen.5  Comparatively, the danger that the clerical and managerial 
staff faced was negligible; consequently, the post-1913 “Safety First” 
campaign concentrated only upon the manual staff.  I follow that 
distinction. 
In examining how the GWR attempted to convey their safety 
messages between approximately 1900 and 1920, I argue that, with the 
introduction of the “Safety First” campaign in 1913, the GWR 
attempted to make their safety messages immediately “accessible” to 
the staff.  The American origins of the campaign highlight the process 
                                                   
4 Although Mark Aldrich, Kurt Wetzel, and Dianne Bennett and William 
Graebner make brief mention of occupational safety education techniques, 
such references simply list the various media used to convey safety messages; 
detailed analysis of the ways in which the safety education was supposed to 
work is lacking.  See Mark Aldrich, “Safety First Comes to the Railroads, 1910-
1939,” Railroad History 166 (Spring 1992): 7-33; Aldrich, Safety First, 136-
41, 199-202; Kurt Wetzel, “Railroad Management’s Response to Operating 
Employees Accidents, 1890-1913,” Labor History 21 (1980): 351-68; Dianne 
Bennett and William Graebner, “Safety First: Slogan and Symbol of the 
Industrial Safety Movement,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 
68 (June 1975): 243-56. 
5 For example, in an impressive analysis, Ewan Knox has disaggregated Board 
of Trade statistics for numbers of employees killed and injured for selected 
manual grades.  To take one grade, between 1908 and 1913, an average of 30 
shunters were killed and 926 injured each year; this represents a fatality rate 
of 22 per 10,000 and an injury rate of 670 per 10,000; Ewan Knox, “Blood on 
the Tracks: Railway Employers and Safety in Late-Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain,” Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 12 (Autumn 2001): 6-7. 
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of cross-cultural transfer involved in the introduction of this system of 
safety to Britain.  In examining the content of the “Safety First” 
campaign, I question the assumption that “Safety First” was a radical 
reinvention of occupational safety, not only on the railroads, but also 
within British business as a whole.  While the methods of dissemina-
tion changed, the safety messages themselves remained unaltered.  
Thus, in repeating the pre-1913 messages through a reinvented 
technique, the GWR actually renewed occupational safety.6
Occupational Safety on British Railroads Prior to 1913 
Before 1913, GWR management, in common with that of all British 
railroads, relied on very formal methods to communicate occupational 
safety messages.  These methods consisted of the Rule Book, circulars 
discussing specific points (and usually reiterating the relevant rule), 
and supervision of the men at work.7  Although the available statistics 
on employee death and injury are highly problematic, they are at least 
indicative of the scale of the problem confronting the GWR and other 
railroad companies.8  Between 1900 and 1913, the annual average of 
railroad employees killed and injured was 485 and 20,737 respectively, 
with figures rising between these dates.9  The companies’ continued 
reliance on the Rule Book and circular to promote workplace safety 
seems to have had a limited effect in preventing accidents.  An 
examination of the formality of these methods is productive. 
As shown in Figure 1, the Rule Book was not designed to be 
attractive; it was compulsory.  The reader was unlikely to read the solid 
mass of text except when compelled to do so.  The tone of the text 
offered little encouragement, using official, legalistic language; it 
appeared to be a top-down lecture from the management to the 
worker.10  For example, according to Rule 273(d): 
                                                   
 
6 Mike Esbester, “‘Dead on the Point of Safety’: Employee Safety Education on 
the Great Western Railway, 1913-1939” (Ph.D. thesis in progress, Institute of 
Railway Studies and Transport History, University of York). 
7 The use of the gender-specific “men” is deliberate; at this date, the railway 
did not employ women in the manual tasks under discussion.  As a result of 
this, the “Safety First” campaign was (self-consciously or not) highly 
gendered, a theme that I shall explore in future work. 
8 There is no guarantee that all injuries were reported; the increases caused by 
the tightening definition of “accident” in 1895 and 1906 indicate that prior to 
those dates some work-related injuries went unrecorded.  See also the com-
ments of Knox, which are applicable to the statistics used in this paper; Knox, 
“Blood on the Tracks,” 5-8. 
9 Figures aggregated from General Report to the Board of Trade upon the 
Accidents that have occurred on the Railways of the United Kingdom for the 
years 1900-1913 inclusive.  Although beyond the scope of my paper, possible 
reasons for the increases in casualties include the intensification of work and 
“speeding-up” and increases in traffic density on the railroad network. 
10 Even the layout of the Rule Book echoed that of the statute book, with the 
abbreviated form of the rule in the margin, and the full explanation as the 
main body of the text.  The perception of Rule Book and circular as legalistic 
was not confined to the workers; in 1915 management publicly recognized the 
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The men must . . . desist from work in cases of fog or falling 
snow when the Foreman, Ganger, or Leading Man considers 
that they would not have sufficient warning of the approach of 
a train, provided such discontinuance of work does not en-
danger the safety of the trains.11
 
FIGURE 1 
GWR 1905 Rule Book, pp. 14-15. 
 
 
Source: Courtesy of the National Archives of the UK (PRO): ref. RAIL 
1134/163.
 
There was no expectation that employees would engage with the 
Rule Book: it was a condition of employment that they were required to 
abide by.12  However, such formality was dramatically altered in 1913.  
                                                                                                                                     
difference of the new style of “Safety First”: “We made straight, plain, homely 
talks on the subject [safety] a special feature of [‘Safety First’].  There was 
none of the Notice-is-hereby-given style about them.”  Great Western 
Railway Magazine [hereafter, GWRM] (June 1915), 152.  Unless otherwise 
acknowledged, I viewed all sources in the National Railway Museum, 
England. 
11 The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) RAIL 
1134/163, GWR Rule Book (Paddington, U.K., 1905), Rule 273(d), 154. 
12 “Engage” is a problematic term; however, it can be taken to imply some sort 
of a mental stimulation induced in the reading of the item. 
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This change was not a spontaneous reinvention of occupational safety, 
but rather was rooted in American developments. 
The American Origins of “Modern” British Occupational 
Safety Education 
In 1910, Ralph Richards initiated “Safety First” on the Chicago and 
North Western Railway, a movement that spread rapidly across the 
U.S. railroad system and ushered in a new safety culture.  Transfer of 
“Safety First” was swift, both within the United States and across the 
Atlantic to Britain.  The period from 1910 and 1912 was one of 
establishment and acceptance (at least by management) within the 
United States.13  Between 1913 and 1915, “Safety First” was established 
and accepted in Britain (again, at least by management).14
Proportionately, greater scholarly attention has been paid to the 
East-West transfer between Europe and the United States.15  There is 
less documentation of the British look toward North America in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.16  The British railroad in-
dustry made substantial use of American innovations at this time; 
Robert Irving, David Howell, and Geoffrey Channon have explored the 
                                                   
13 For example, three years after its introduction in 1910, “Safety First” had 
spread over approximately 70% of U.S. railroad mileage.  TNA: PRO, RAIL 
1005/426, “R.C. Richards and the Safety First Movement,” in Chicago and 
North Western Railway Traffic Department Monthly Bulletin 2 (Nov. 1913): 
16. 
14 Although it does not appear that Britain produced similar statistics, we see 
the acceptance of this type of safety education by other railroad companies in 
the uptake of the safety movement.  The GWR made its safety literature freely 
available to other companies.  Those reported as having adopted the format 
and style of “Safety First” included the London and South Western, Great 
North of Scotland, Midland and Great North Joint, Wirral, Rhymney, 
Cambrian, Cardiff, and Isle of Wight Central Railways.  See GWRM (June 
1915), 152-53.  Other companies known to have produced “Safety First” 
material at this time include the North Eastern Railway and the Hull and 
Barnsley Railway. 
15 See for example Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a 
Progressive Age (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); James Kloppenberg, Uncertain 
Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American 
Thought, 1870-1920 (New York, 1986). 
16 Brief mention is made in Albert Kenwood and Alan Lougheed, The Growth 
of the International Economy, 1820-2000 (1971; London, 1999), 130; David 
Jeremy and Darwin Stapleton, “Transfers between Culturally-Related 
Nations: The Movement of Textile and Railroad Technologies between Britain 
and the United States, 1780-1840,” in International Technology Transfer.  
Europe, Japan and the USA, 1700-1914, ed. David Jeremy (Aldershot, U.K., 
1991), 39, 45; Jonathan Zeitlin, “Introduction,” in Americanization and Its 
Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe 
and Japan, ed. Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herringel (Oxford, U.K., 2000), 1-
2; Jonathan Zeitlin, “Americanizing British Engineering?  Strategic Debate, 
Selective Adaptation, and Hybrid Innovation in Post-War Reconstruction, 
1945-1960,” in Americanization and its Limits, ed. Zeitlin and Herringel, 126, 
180. 
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transfer of American techniques and technology to Britain.17  Although 
this pre-1913 transfer did not include safety, the precedent of 
information flow was established, and it prepared the way for the 
diffusion of American safety culture.  The case of railroad and 
industrial safety education is a clear demonstration of the transfer of 
business practice from the United States to Europe.18
The rapid spread of the “Safety First” movement was a product of 
several factors.  The cultural similarities between Britain and America 
facilitated exchange.  David Jeremy and Darwin Stapleton have com-
mented that transfer was “relatively quick and effective, presumably 
because they were closely related culturally shared language, legal and 
economic systems; and they enjoyed a common technical heritage.”19  
Various channels of transmission existed between the nations, 
including first-hand observation (through research visits and personnel 
exchange), publication (in technical journals and the like), and direct 
exchange of information (by request).20
The GWR certainly used these transmission channels when 
introducing the “Safety First” campaign to British railroads.  Technical 
journals and books were the initial source of information for the GWR.  
A memorandum of March 1913 suggesting that the GWR imitate the 
American “Safety First” campaign referred to the Illinois Central 
Railroad Magazine and George Bradshaw’s 1912 book, Prevention of 
Railroad Accidents.21  By 1910, the American journal the Railway Age 
Gazette was published every Friday in New York, Chicago, Cleveland, 
and—significantly—London.  It contained articles and material relating 
to “Safety First” in America.22  There were similar reports on American 
                                                   
 
17 Robert J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1914 
(Leicester, U.K., 1976), esp. 211-27; David Howell, Respectable Radicals: 
Studies in the Politics of Railway Trade Unionism (Aldershot, U.K., 1999), 
esp. 48, 71-76; Geoffrey Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 
1830-1940: Studies in Economic and Business History (Aldershot, U.K., 
2001), esp. 267-78. 
18 This is not to ignore the subsequent re-export of the GWR’s Anglicized 
version of “Safety First” to North America (see note 26). 
19 Jeremy and Stapleton, “Transfers between Culturally-Related Nations,” 31; 
see also Kenwood and Lougheed, International Economy, 128. 
20 For example, see David Jeremy, “Introduction: Some of the Larger Issues 
posed by Technology Transfer,” in International Technology Transfer, ed. 
Jeremy, 1; David Jeremy, “Introduction: New and Old Problems in the 
Transfer of Technology,” in The Transfer of International Technology: 
Europe, Japan and the USA in the Twentieth Century, ed. David Jeremy 
(Aldershot, U.K., 1992), 3; Jennifer Tann, “Diffusion of Management Thought 
and Practice, 1880-1970,” in The Transfer of International Technology, ed. 
Jeremy, 203. 
21 TNA: PRO, RAIL 1005/426, “Prevention of Accidents,” 1 March 1913; 
George Bradshaw, Prevention of Railroad Accidents (New York, 1912). 
22 The first reference to the fledgling campaign came in the 1 April 1910 issue; 
subsequent references proliferated with the extension of the campaign; see 
Railway Age Gazette, 1 April 1910, p. 905.  It was observed in one British 
  
Mike Esbester // The Great Western Railway and Occupational Safety  8 
safety practice in British-based periodicals.23  The library of the 
London School of Economics housed American texts on safety.24  
Evidently, there was widespread and rapid diffusion of information on 
the “Safety First” movement, easily accessible in Britain. 
In addition, the Great Western Railway requested information on 
“Safety First” directly.  Two letters from American railroads, written in 
response to GWR inquiries, have survived with accompanying material 
from the “Safety First” campaign in North America, documenting the 
free exchange of information.25  The American “Safety First” campaign 
was incontestably the initial basis for the British safety movement.  We 
see further evidence in the techniques used on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  The similarities in general railroad culture ensured that it was 
possible to use the same methods of disseminating safety messages.  
Articles in staff magazines, books, talks, competitions, and posters were 
all in use on both continents.  American railroad safety culture found 
its way to Britain through processes of diffusion and through active 
propagation by the GWR.26
1913 and Beyond: “Safety First” in Britain 
After 1913, then, the American-style “Safety First” campaign seemed to 
reinvent safety education in Britain.  The campaign was a huge contrast 
to the formality of the Rule Book.  It used techniques more akin to 
journalism in order to convey its message: in particular in articles 
                                                                                                                                     
railroad company magazine that “The familiar phrase [Safety First] ‘leaps to 
the eye’ from almost every page of every American railway periodical.” 
North Eastern Railway Magazine [hereafter, NERM] (May 1914), 109. 
23 For example, two weeks after a feature in the 1 April 1910 Railway Age 
Gazette, the British-based Railway Gazette reprinted verbatim a report on 
“Safety First;” see Railway Gazette (15 April 1910), 433.  See also: NERM 
(April 1913), 98; ibid. (Nov. 1914), 287; Great Central Railway Journal 
[hereafter, GCRJ] (May 1914), 252; GCRJ (Dec. 1914), 178; Great Eastern 
Railway Magazine (Dec. 1917), 264. 
24 The booklets bear their original accession numbers, indicating that the 
library added them when published.  LSE HE1 (73) D20, Ralph Richards, 
“Prevention of Accidents,” May 1911 [original number: p17459]; LSE HE1 (73) 
B6, Ralph Richards, “What the Safety Committees of the Chicago and North 
Western Railway have done for the Conservation of Men,” 1912 [original 
number: p17460]. 
25 The GWR file entitled “‘Safety First’ movement,” now held in the National 
Archives, contains fifteen items, of which eleven relate to North American 
railroads.  These include two letters from American companies, written in 
response to Great Western Railway inquiries.  TNA: PRO, RAIL 1005/426, 
“‘Safety First’ Movement,” various items, 1913-1916. 
26 Note that there were differences between the American and British versions 
of “Safety First” from as early as March 1914 that grew increasingly significant 
over time.  I have explored this aspect in the paper from which this section is 
drawn: “The Transfer of American Railway Safety Culture to Britain, c.1910-
1930: ‘Save us from American Railroad Methods,’” paper presented to the 
International Association for the History of Transport, Traffic and Mobility 
annual conference, Detroit, Mich., Nov. 2004. 
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published in the staff journal, the Great Western Railway Magazine.27  
Even the use of the Magazine was significant, as it attempted to make 
the safety messages attractive to the employees; this was a fundamental 
shift in prevailing business practices.  In comparison with the formality 
of the Rule Book, the articles were revolutionary.  The GWR actively 
portrayed itself as reinventing safety: “We made straight, plain, homely 
talks on the subject a special feature of [‘Safety First’].  There was none 
of the Notice-is-hereby-given style about them.”28  These were articles 
designed with the employee in mind, demonstrating a new approach to 
safety.29
Promotion of interest and accessibility was through the use of the 
visual, a recognizably modern technique.  In terms of immediate 
impact, it is informative to compare the Rule Book (Figure 1) with some 
sample pages from the GWR’s safety campaign (Figures 2 and 3).  It is 
evident which is the more striking and attractive; the modern “Safety 
First” offered a stark contrast with the old form of safety information. 
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the prominence of photographs within 
the campaign; their use resembled what we know in the twenty-first 
century as “photo-journalism”: the communication of ideas through 
photography.  This was of enormous significance: for the first time a 
business attempted to make safety messages immediately accessible 
and comprehensible.  A common technique used two images, one 
illustrating the “incorrect” method of working, the other illustrating the 
“correct” method.  Figure 3 illustrates this binary; the central 
photograph is atypical in that it depicted the consequences of 
“incorrect” working. 
Among the many techniques used to focus attention on important 
points found in the text of the campaign articles were the use of 
capitalization or italics to stress certain points (Figure 4).  In Figure 5, 
the print was reoriented.  In doing so, it displayed both a relevance to 
the article—this was the viewpoint of the man who was “lying injured 
on the ground”—and the active involvement of the reader, who would 
have had to turn the Magazine to read the text, thereby assuming the 
position of the injured man.30  Such visual emphases all attempted to 
reinforce the ideas found in the articles; the intention was to force 
workers to notice the safety messages.  Although the “new journalism” 
of the popular press used such techniques in the 1890s, their
                                                   
27 The means of communication will have had a significant impact upon the 
effectiveness (or potential effectiveness) of the safety message; for further 
consideration of this factor, see Mike Esbester, “Consumption Habits and the 
Production of Workplace Safety: The role of the Great Western Railway 
Magazine, c.1913-1930,” paper presented to the Social History Society annual 
conference, Dublin, Ireland, Jan. 2005. 
28 GWRM (June 1915),  152. 
29 Or, indeed, to communication within business. 
30 GWRM (Feb. 1914), 35. 
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                                                        FIGURE 2 
 
 
Source: Great Western Railway Magazine (Jan. 1914), 8; National Railway 
Museum, England. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
Source:  Great Western Railway Magazine (Nov. 1913), 356; National 
Railway Museum, England. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Source: Great Western Railway Magazine (March 1914), 70, 
  National Railway Museum, England. 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
 
 
 
Source: Great Western Railway Magazine (Feb. 1914), 35, 
National Railway Museum, England. 
 
application to safety education marked the start of the modern era of 
occupational information provision.31
Supplementing the visual emphasis was the writing tone.  The 
“Safety First” articles were extremely informal—something previously 
unknown in official communication.  Epitomizing this was the Decem-
ber 1913 article, which opened: 
Human lives are cheap.  Dirt cheap.  Men risk them for 
nothing.  They sell them like old crocks. . . . There’s no 
‘gammon’ about this. . . . You’ve just got to overlook the 
                                                   
31 For more on the “new journalism,” see Joel Wiener, ed., Papers for the 
Millions: The New Journalism in Britain, 1850s to 1914 (London, 1988). 
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possibility of a slip . . . and you’re done for before you can say 
‘Jack Robinson.’32
The intention of the informality of the text was to echo a talk between 
people: a conversation, not a lecture as in the Rule Book. 
 
FIGURE 6 
 
 
 
 
Source: Great Western Railway Magazine (March 1925), 103, 
National Railway Museum, England. 
  
Figure 6 depicts the “pocket token,” introduced in 1916.  The men 
were supposed to keep it in their pockets at all times, among their loose 
change; it was the size of an old penny, about three centimeters across.  
Every time money was used, then, the token would be brought out and 
it “would attract your notice at divers times and in all sorts of 
circumstances . . . all this would tend . . . to cultivate the habit of readily 
recalling to mind the vital question [‘Is It Safe?’]”33  Whether or not it 
did so is debatable, but the inventive technique of conveying the safety 
message is the important factor.  What is clear is that this campaign 
appeared to signal a radical reinvention of occupational safety, from the 
formality of the Rule Book to the highly visual and highly informal 
“Safety First.”  This was nothing short of a transformation in existing 
business practice. 
Understanding 1913 
This change begs the question: why 1913?  What does the introduction 
of “Safety First” suggest about the motives behind the development of 
occupational safety in British business?  There seems to have been 
virtually no public demand for improved railroad employee safety, 
although we must not discount the power that the public voice could 
have on industries.  It is possible that the GWR grew increasingly 
                                                   
32 GWRM (Dec. 1913), 386. 
33 Ibid. (Sept. 1916), 209.  This also addresses the extension of the Company 
into the employee’s life: the token was supposed to work off-duty as well as 
on-duty. 
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concerned with the mounting human cost of its operations, something 
that the campaign itself certainly emphasized.  However, other factors 
were of greater importance in influencing the transformation of safety 
practices. 
Although the surviving records make little reference to the 
economic cost of occupational death and injury, I suggest that finances 
played a significant part in informing the GWR’s approach to safety.  
The “Safety First” campaign was a social solution to the safety problem. 
Technological solutions were also available, but they were extremely 
expensive; for example, an estimate by the railroad employer’s 
association put the cost of installing automatic couplings at “several 
million” pounds.34  By comparison, the cost of an educational campaign 
was negligible, yet the perception would be that the company was 
actively addressing the issue.35
Through “Safety First,” we can understand some of the decision-
making processes that shaped business practice and see how employee 
safety on the railroads was a product of social considerations.  The 
timing of the campaign’s introduction highlights the complexity of the 
decision-making process and the limits of company autonomy.  
Pressures external to the GWR played an important role in bringing 
about “Safety First.”  Businesses were sensitive to government inter-
vention in their organization and in their labor process.  This was 
particularly true of the railroads, which repeatedly claimed that 
interference in matters of discipline would erode safety standards.36  
Trades union pressure on employee safety issues increased in 1911 and 
1912, and included calls for the compulsory introduction of (expensive) 
automatic couplings.  Throughout 1913, trades union agitation called 
for the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the safety of 
railroad employees. The state was not willing to concede a Royal 
Commission, but instead placated the unions with a lesser 
Departmental Committee on the subject, agreed to in February 1914. 
                                                   
34 The figures were produced by the Railway Companies’ Association in 1899 
and cited in Knox, “Blood on the Tracks,” 16.  The Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) opined in their monthly journal 
in 1921, “in all . . . cases of accidents occurring at the present time, the 
incidence of cost, rather than the value of human life, is the first 
consideration.”  See Locomotive Journal (July 1921), 258.  The financial 
aspect continued to play a determining role in the various companies’ 
considerations of safety well after 1920; the Unions continued complaining 
about the lack of automatic couplings into the 1950s. 
35 Although I have been unable to locate any records of the costs involved, I 
believe that the expense may simply have been included in the “normal” 
production costs of the Great Western Railway Magazine. 
36 One of the highest-ranking company officials, Frank Potter, as chief 
assistant to the general manager, in 1909 publicly stated of “Rules affecting 
safety” that “the tendency of recent railway legislation, more particularly as 
affecting the staff of railways, has been in a direction which has . . . actually 
had the effect of weakening discipline.”  See Frank Potter, “The Government 
in Relation to the Railways of the Country,” GWR (London) Lecture and 
Debating Society, 11 Feb. 1909. 
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The railroad companies were concerned that what they termed state 
“interference” would increase and that the state would determine how 
work should be carried out on the railroads.  It is no coincidence, then, 
that the GWR introduced its safety campaign in August 1913.  Although 
at this time the state had yet to declare its interest, it was possible for 
the companies to foresee the appointment of some sort of investigative 
committee.  The threatened state investigation thus seems to have 
played at least some part in determining the timing of the introduction 
of the “Safety First” campaign in Britain.  The company could 
demonstrate, when necessary, that it was voluntarily attempting to 
improve employee safety.  In this context, it is clear why the campaign 
needed to look and feel different from previous attempts to influence 
employee safety.  Thus, the GWR did not simply attempt to block 
external intervention; rather, it provided an alternative locus for action, 
retaining some degree of control for the company.  The same process 
has been observed by Arthur McIvor and Ronnie Johnston in the 
nationalized British coal industry, in relation to occupational health: 
“The National Coal Board . . . fully realised that it could only stave off 
the implementation of broader national regulations for dust control if it 
could show that it had the dust problem under control.”37
The GWR claimed that “Safety First” addressed the needs of its 
employees.  Yet it was using the campaign to address constituencies 
beyond the employees: the trade unions and the state.  In such 
negotiations it is possible to see how “safety” was socially constructed, a 
product of power relationships among union, state, and business. 
The First World War intervened and the Departmental Committee 
was never reconvened.  British business faced severe challenges in the 
postwar period.  The apparent decline in British economic perform-
ance, in comparison with the United States and European countries, 
featured prominently in national debate.  With reference to the 
railroads, the postwar years saw enormous structural change, with a 
state-imposed reorganization of the entire industry.  In light of such 
immediate and fundamental concerns, occupational safety was 
relegated to lesser prominence by both the state and the trade unions.  
Consequently, the well-established “Safety First” methodology of 
occupational safety education went uncontested.  This left control of 
safety messages firmly in the hands of business management.38  The 
entire railroad industry and other business concerns rapidly adopted 
the model; by 1918, a “British Industrial Safety First Association” was 
established.  The managerial control of occupational safety was reflect-
ed in the ideology underwriting “Safety First.” 
                                                   
37 McIvor and Johnston, “Reinvention and Renewal,” 18. 
38 McIvor and Johnston have observed a similar situation.  Methods instituted 
before nationalization in the British mining industry were taken as “natural” 
and continued in the post-nationalization era.  Options and patterns of 
thought developed within the pre-established channels, which greatly 
restricted the available choices.  This was not quite so deliberate as the 
railroad companies’ use of “Safety First,” but the parallels are interesting; see 
McIvor and Johnston, “Reinvention and Renewal,” 9. 
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Renewing the Safety Message: Responsibility 
Having examined the techniques that the Great Western Railway used 
to impart its safety messages, we now turn to the content of those 
messages.  Rather than totally reinventing occupational safety, the 
“Safety First” campaign repeated existing safety conceptions, in effect 
renewing occupational safety.  A large number of messages were 
present in both styles of safety literature, including claims to authority, 
legitimacy, and knowledge, and ideas of co-operation, “duty,” and 
paternalism.  On paternalism, it is important to note that “Safety First” 
was presented as a further aspect of “welfare capitalism,” linked to the 
provision of other “benefits” by the companies.  We will concentrate on 
one component of the campaign messages: responsibility. 
The belief that workers were responsible for their own safety was 
well established among the managerial grades by the 1870s.39  
Managers came to see the provision of the Rule Book as their sum duty 
of care toward employees; if the rules were followed, the worker would 
remain safe.  According to circular no. 1,769, issued in March 1898, the 
directors of the GWR were “satisfied that much more can be done [to 
reduce risks] . . . by the exercise of greater care and by a more strict 
observance of those Regulations which are intended to prevent 
accidents to the staff.”40  This understanding created what Ewan Knox 
has called “a culture of blame towards the workforce.”  In the manage-
ment view, accidents resulted from carelessness and a neglect of duty.41  
The preamble to a circular of July 1905 stated “Several accidents . . . 
have recently happened to members of the staff having been clearly 
caused by a neglect of those Rules and Regulations of the Company 
which have been framed in the interests of safety.”42  Within this 
statement, there was an underlying assumption that the provision of 
the means of safety—the rules and regulations—was the company’s 
responsibility.  Beyond this, the act of safety—the observance of the 
rules and regulations—was the responsibility of the individual.  In 
providing the rules, management perceived itself as having discharged 
its duty to the staff. 
Of the period before 1910, Knox notes that the figure of the “careless 
worker” was “a central plank in the railroad companies’ strategy for 
avoiding responsibility for the safety of the workforce.”43  Discipline 
was central to the managerial interpretation of safety as individual 
                                                   
39 In 1875 George Findlay, chief traffic manager of the London and North 
Western Railway, stated that “knowing that self-preservation ought to 
influence a man in the performance of his duty, I do not think that we [the 
company] can do much more than point out the desirability to the men of 
avoiding danger.”  See Royal Commission on Railway Accidents, Minutes of 
Evidence, C.1637-II, Parliamentary Papers (1877) 48, Q. 31,027. 
40 TNA PRO RAIL 253/319, p. 310, GWR Circular 1,769, “Accidents to 
Company’s Servants,” March 1898, p. 2. 
41 Knox, “Blood on the Tracks,” 22-25. 
42 TNA PRO RAIL 253/319, p. 461, GWR Circular 2,016, “Accidents to 
Company’s Servants,” July 1905, p. 1. 
43 Knox, “Blood on the Tracks,” 23. 
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responsibility.  Rule 24(a) of the 1905 Rule Book stated, “The servants 
of the Company . . . must not expose themselves to danger.”44  This rule 
covered every contingency and ensured that potentially any accident 
could be found to be the fault of the employee.  Company accident 
investigations were conducted “to secure that any disregard of Rules or 
Regulations which may have contributed to the mishap, shall be 
brought to light and suitably dealt with.”45  It was therefore incumbent 
upon workers to protect themselves while at work.  These themes were 
repeated in the “Safety First” campaign after 1913, a fact that 
undermines the apparent total reinvention of occupational safety.46  
Although the techniques were radically altered, the company’s 
conception of safety as the responsibility of the worker was consistent. 
From the outset, “Safety First” attempted to define occupational 
injuries as “personal accidents”—with the attendant implication of the 
individual employee’s responsibility.  The “blame culture” was not 
confined to the railroads.  Attributing blame to the victim was certainly 
known in the 1810s.47  Carson has identified the “displacement of 
responsibility onto servants” as a feature of the conventionalization of 
the violation of safety laws in factories.48  Similarly, in reference to the 
cotton industry, McIvor records “There existed a long tradition of 
blaming the victim—of ascribing responsibility for health and safety at 
work to the individual worker concerned.”49  Within this context, it is 
therefore unsurprising that the railroads also adopted this convenient 
and established mode to evade potentially costly responsibility.50  The 
first article in the campaign, in August 1913, claimed “many a man in 
                                                   
44 TNA PRO RAIL 1134/163, GWR Rule Book (Paddington, U.K., 1905), Rule 
24(a), p. 14. 
45 TNA PRO RAIL 253/319, p. 361, GWR Circular 1,822, “Accidents to 
Company’s Servants,” March 1900. 
46 This is not to suggest that “Safety First” replaced the rule book; rule books 
continued beyond 1913, and indeed took precedence over “Safety First.”  As 
the analysis demonstrates, “Safety First” could be considered simply a new 
way of conveying the old messages found in the rule book.  The rules 
themselves underwent relatively little alteration before the Second World 
War: a 1933 Rule Book is almost indistinguishable from a 1913 one. 
47 Roger Cooter and Bill Luckin, “Accidents in History: An Introduction,” in 
Accidents in History, ed. Cooter and Luckin, 3. 
48 Wesley George Carson, “The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime,” 
International Journal for the Sociology of Law 7 (1979): 53. 
49 McIvor, “State Intervention and Work Intervention,” 130; Richard Beding-
ton, “The Growth and Awareness of Health and Safety at Work” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Aston, 1983), 9, 288, 381. 
50 The idea of personal responsibility was seen in representations of health as 
well as safety, on the railroads and beyond.  According to the Great Western 
Railway Magazine, “It is the duty of all to be healthy, and to do observe the 
laws of hygiene that he may contribute to the full measure of his individual 
well-being to the public good.”  See GWRM (Dec. 1892), 24.  Bedington, “The 
Growth and Awareness,” 381, sees this as giving the employer a further means 
with which to control the workers, legitimized by contemporaneous ideas of 
“self-help.” 
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usual and simple duties places his life and limb . . . in peril through 
sheer want of ordinary care.”51  This motif was echoed throughout the 
campaign.  In March 1920 it was claimed that the “greatest problem is 
to find a way of getting you to be always mindful of the need for care 
and forethought.”52  The management author told the employees 
“We’re out to get you to help yourselves.”53  This was to be achieved 
through “Safety First”; it was “up to our readers to put the advice into 
practice.”54  As with the Rule Book and circulars, the provision of the 
“Safety First” campaign was the limit of the GWR’s responsibility; the 
responsibility for practice lay with the individual.  In this, the 
supposedly reinvented campaign was based on the same premise of 
employee responsibility as the pre-1913 safety measures. 
Nowhere was the message of individual responsibility more evident 
than in the “watchword” chosen to signify the ideals of the “Safety 
First” movement.  The question “Is It Safe?” (seen on the 1916 pocket 
token, Figure 6) was the epitome of individual responsibility.55  
Employees were supposed to ask “Is It Safe?” before performing any 
duty.  The company was not providing direct advice; it was very clearly 
the duty of the individual to judge the situation and respond.  
Accompanying the phrase “Is It Safe?” was the managerial belief that 
accidents were a consequence of needless risk-taking by employees.  
This was an understanding derived from the pre-existing conception 
that railroad work was safe as long as the correct procedure was 
followed.  In 1916, it was argued that the employees “must contrive to 
give a thought to Safety before they heedlessly step foul of an avoidable 
risk or thoughtlessly set a danger-trap for themselves.”56  Such rhetoric 
was self-reinforcing.  It denied the value of technological solutions to 
accidents, implying that “Safety First” education would render 
mechanical safety devices unnecessary.  By using a new format, “Safety 
First” renewed occupational safety education, but reinforced the 
message of personal responsibility. 
As with the Rule Books before 1913, the management perceived 
“Safety First” as fulfilling their safety obligations toward the staff.  The 
employees were told “We [the management] can’t do more than point 
out the ‘safety’ method.  It’s up to you to adopt it.”57  That “Safety First” 
did not signal a true shift in the managerial conception of responsibility 
is demonstrated in the use that was made of the Rule Book.  “Safety 
First” was based on the Rule Book and therefore embodied the 
managerial conceptions of responsibility built into the rules.  Rule 
24(a), ordering the employees not to expose themselves to danger, was 
                                                   
51 GWRM (Aug. 1913), 256. 
52 Ibid. (March 1920), 49. 
53 Ibid. (Feb. 1914), 36. 
54 Ibid. (June 1915), 152. 
55 This had significant implications for the power relationships between 
employee and employer, as it left control of the work environment in the 
hands of the worker; I explore this theme in depth in my Ph.D. dissertation. 
56 GWRM (Sept. 1916), 209. 
57 Ibid. (Oct. 1913), 321. 
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explicitly written into the campaign in 1913.58  This was by no means an 
isolated example.  The GWR management consistently presented safety 
as an individual rather than a corporate responsibility. 
Conclusions 
I have explored the place of occupational safety in business history, 
discussing cross-cultural transfer of ideas and practices, and some of 
the factors involved in the decision-making process in the early 
twentieth century.  I have demonstrated that while the Americanized 
“Safety First” campaign might have introduced innovative techniques 
for conveying messages into British business practice, the content of 
the messages remained essentially unchanged.  Such a combination of 
new and old was not confined to the railroad industry.  McIvor and 
Johnston came to the same conclusion with regard to the British coal 
mining industry and employee health after 1946.59  I have dealt with 
only a fraction of the material in terms of both the techniques and 
strategies used in the campaign and the messages contained within the 
GWR’s articulation of “Safety First.”  I have largely considered the 
managerial perspective.  This is not to deny the importance of the 
employees’ and trade unions’ responses to “Safety First”; rather, it is to 
recognize that appropriate attention to the complex, and at times 
contradictory, responses of those groups demands another article. 
“Safety First” on the railroads did not signal reinvention, but neither 
did it demonstrate simple repetition.  By combining existing content 
with new techniques, “Safety First” represented a renewal of 
occupational safety on the railroads of Britain.  In many ways, this was 
the birth of modern occupational safety education.  Today British 
businesses use videos and the Internet to reach employees, following 
the same ideals of “accessibility” promoted by the GWR over ninety 
years ago.  Whether or not the same articulation of responsibility is 
contained within today’s employee safety education is debatable, but it 
is an area that demands serious attention if safety at work is to be 
improved.60
                                                   
58 Ibid. (Aug. 1913), 256-57. 
59 McIvor and Johnston, “Reinvention or Renewal?” 35. 
60 Some scholars suggest that in 2005 businesses still place responsibility for 
occupational safety with the employee rather than the employer.  For the 
British experience, see Theo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury 
(London, 1997); for the Canadian experience, Charles Reasons, Lois Ross, and 
Craig Paterson, Assault on the Worker: Occupational Health and Safety in 
Canada (Toronto, 1981). 
  
